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1.  Introduction 
 
The economy of China is booming with annual growth of 8 - 12 percent in the last decade. 
However, development and growth is mostly concentrated in the Eastern part of China, and 
mainly in urban areas. The rural areas, and particularly those in the Western parts of China, 
are lagging in economic development. Income inequality between rural and urban is about 1 
to 3.2, and is still increasing (Feng, 2006). This is not to say that rural China has not made any 
changes yet. Already major achievements have been obtained: productivity has grown rapidly, 
exports are rising, and rural income has dramatically risen. Still, one of the major challenges 
for the Chinese society in general is to make the rural economy an integral part of the 
modernization.  
 
The booming economy and the political liberalization provide opportunities for farmers to 
shift to new lines of production, to enter new markets, and to set up new supply chain 
relationships. In order to strengthen their bargaining position, to exchange experiences, and to 
facilitate innovation, farmers are establishing producer organizations (POs). In recent years, 
the number of POs is rapidly increasing, although the absolute number of POs is still 
relatively low (Shen et al., 2005).  
 
One of the interesting issues in studying POs in China is the role of the government in 
supporting these organizations. While many POs in China, just like in other parts of the 
world, are voluntary member-based organizations, the influence of the state is still very 
strong. The new legislation on cooperatives, which will be effective from July 1, 2007, 
emphasizes that POs are farmer self-help organizations, established for the benefit of 
members and run by the members. However, the law also encourages state agencies at 
regional and local level to actively support the establishment of new POs. Finding a balance 
between obtaining state support on the one hand while remaining purely independent 
organizations on the other hand, is one of the major challenges for new POs in China. 
 
This chapter presents background information on the rise of new rural POs in China and it 
discusses several of the challenges these POs face. It starts with a brief introduction to the 
recent political and economic changes, which have tremendous impact on rural development. 
The new law on cooperatives is an important change in the institutional environment of POs. 
The next section discusses the role of POs in the changing agricultural markets, where 
liberalization of market and the rise of supermarkets make it more difficult for small farmers 
to compete. Subsequently some figures are given on new producer organizations in China. A 
number of case studies present more practical information on the challenges of POs in rural 
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China. We conclude with a number of observations on the challenges for organizing effective 




2.  Economic and political changes in China 
 
Since the early 1980s, China is reforming its economy from a planned economy towards a 
market-oriented economy. This transformation process has already led to fundamental 
changes in the economic landscape of China. For instance, in the 1990s, per-capita grain 
output reached a level similar to that in developed countries (Sonntag et al., 2005). Rising 
food exports demonstrate that China’s farmers can now compete in international markets. 
Rural incomes have risen significantly and hundreds of millions of people have escaped 
poverty during this time.  
 
Many rural areas do not (fully) participate in the economic modernization. The 200 million 
small-scale farming households still follow traditional production and marketing patterns. 
However, market developments dictate a need for increasing the scale of production, 
enhancing the quality of products, and improving the efficiency of supply chains. The 
challenge for Chinese policymakers is to promote agricultural modernization in such a way 
that rural areas, particularly those more distant from the large urban developments of the East, 
will also benefit from the overall economic growth. In addition, the country as a whole is 
experiencing a shift from a rural economy towards an urban economy, from agriculture 
towards industry and services. Thus, the challenge for China is to establish effective linkages 
between rural and urban areas and to encourage a large labor shift out of agriculture. 
 
Chinese political leaders have acknowledged that policy reforms are needed to guide the 
economic transformations. Since the mid-1990s, Chinese agricultural officials have promoted 
a “companies leading household” strategy to bring farmers into the commercial food sector 
and raise incomes. This strategy emphasizes links between farmers and processing and 
marketing companies to strengthen farmers’ connections with the market. So-called “Dragon 
head” companies are selected or established by local government authorities to contract with 
farmers to procure produce with specific attributes. The dragon head company provides seed, 
operating loans, fertilizer and other inputs, and technical expertise. Local government 
continues to play a major role in coordinating these linkages between farmers, processing 
industry and markets.1 
 
In 2004, the central government issued the “Document No. 1”, which exclusively deals with 
agricultural and rural development. This document specifically pointed out that farmers’ 
professional associations should be encouraged. The government regards the establishment of 
POs essential in strengthening the competitiveness of the agricultural sector and in realizing 
the economic potential of the agricultural sector. Enhancing competitiveness is necessary as 
China as agreed to open up its markets as part of its obligations under the WTO membership.  
In addition, to continue the combination of economic growth and low inflation requires both 





                                                 
1
 There are some doubts about the viability of this approach (World Bank, 2006; Gale, 2003). Local government 
officials may not have a sufficient knowledge base and financial capacity to guarantee success. In addition, the 
ownership structure of the dragon head companies is not clear. Many seem to be spin-offs of local grain bureaus 
and other government marketing entities. Management decisions seem to reflect government plans to develop 
particular sectors, sometimes resulting in overproduction. Finally, small-scale farmers may not benefit much 
from this approach, as they lack bargaining power when signing contracts with the dragon head companies. 
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A new law on cooperatives 
 
On October 31, 2006, the 10th National People’s Congress of the P.R. of China adopted 
legislation supporting professional farmer cooperatives. The law was later ratified as Order 57 
by President Hu Jintao. Presidential Order 57 will become effective on July 1, 2007. Article 1 
stipulates the reasons for developing this special law: “Its purpose is to facilitate and direct the 
development of farmer Co-operatives, standardize organization and behaviors of them, protect 
legal interests of Co-operatives and members, and foster growth of agricultural and rural 
economy.” Thus, this national law on professional farmer cooperatives provides the legal 
framework for the establishment and the functioning of farmer cooperatives. 
 
A law on cooperatives is of great importance for farmers and their economic organizations. So 
far, much of the group action by farmers has been informally, or it has fallen under various, 
often local, and potentially conflicting, regulations. A national law, applied by provincial and 
regional authorities, provides a uniform legal framework for the whole country.  
 
The importance of legislation for farmer cooperatives has been emphasized by many 
cooperative scholars. For instance, Münker (2005) states that “legislation can make it easier to 
form and run cooperatives, if it offers a clear and easily applicable model, helping the 
organizers to set up the rules necessary for operating joint/group activities in such a way that 
typical conflicts (which may arise among members or among members and the organization) 
are as much as possible avoided.” Without legal status the organization lacks access to credit, 
cannot enter into legally binding contracts, and there is no legal standing to the mutual 
obligations and responsibilities of cooperatives and their members. 
 
While enacting this new law on cooperatives is a very important step in helping farmers to 
improve access to markets, capital and knowledge, there has been some concern about the 
emphasis on cooperatives as a tool of governmental policies for rural development. Münker 
(2006: 11) states that it is an old mistake to “use co-operatives as instruments for 
implementation of government policy, rather than perceiving co-operatives as voluntary and 
independent self-help organizations of their members. Where co-operatives work as 
development tools in the hand of government, it is difficult to see how co-operatives can 
avoid becoming dependent on government.” Münker argues that state sponsorship usually 
turns into state control, which is not only against cooperative principles, but is even 
counterproductive as state-supported cooperatives usually fail to raise member commitment 
(which in turn is needed for collecting capital, effective decision-making and efficient use of 
cooperative facilities).  
 
Fock and Zhao (2006) also call for caution in direct government intervention in the formation 
and operation of farmer groups. In addition, they are concerned about membership 
heterogeneity as the law allows for firms and government-affiliated agencies to become 
member of farmer cooperatives. Heterogeneity of members often leads to conflicts of interests 
within the group and thereby to inefficient and ineffective decisions (Bijman, 2005). The 
rationale for allowing non-farmers to become members lies in the common interest in building 
integrated supply chains or modernizing agriculture. However, this poses serious risks for 
member commitment (and thereby for the sustainability and efficiency of the cooperative) as 
local state agencies and leading enterprises can be very dominant. Fock and Zhao argue that it 
would be better to develop separate programs aiming to improve the efficiency of supply 




3.  Changes in agricultural markets 
 
Markets for agricultural inputs and outputs are rapidly changing in China. During the period 
of planned economy, agricultural inputs and outputs were subject to a system of unified 
supply and marketing. Since the start of the reforms in the early 1980s, markets for 
agricultural inputs have gradually opened up, although in some parts of the country 
government agencies are still the main source of seeds, fertilizers and agrochemicals under a 
system of government licensing and state trading. Most agricultural markets, however, are 
now open to competition. 
 
At least three major developments in agrifood markets are pushing for structural change in the 
agricultural sector, particularly affecting small producers (World Bank, 2006: 13). First, 
China’s entry into WTO has altered the dynamics of domestic markets. WTO membership has 
created opportunities in areas where China has comparative advantage, including livestock, 
aquatic and horticultural products. However, exports are only possible if high and stringent 
quality standards can be met. Many small-scale farmers using traditional production methods 
have difficulty in meeting the international standards and in providing the necessary 
certification to guarantee that the standards are met.  
 
Second, increased consumer sophistication means that they are no longer content with limited 
choice of products or seasonal availability and have a growing awareness of food safety 
issues. However, small producers may have a hard time complying with these quality and 
safety requirements. Demand for uniform products of large quantities as well as supply chain 
measures such as cold-chain transportation all mitigate in favor of large-scale production and 
against small holder farming. Food safety concerns have led to the creation of a variety of 
certification standards, but the cost and effort involved in complying with these standards is 
often beyond the means of individual small scale farmers.  
 
Third, the rise of supermarkets as major food outlets is resulting in a restructuring of supply 
chains, which may make it more difficult for small farmers to compete. Let us take a more 
detailed look at the rapid expansion of supermarkets in China and its effects on supply chain 
organization. 
 
Traditionally, the wet market is the main place for rural and urban consumers to purchase 
fresh agricultural products. Nowadays, supermarkets are taking over this role, at least in urban 
areas. Government policy has not been favorable to wet markets, pushing them to convert into 
modern supermarkets in a move to control hygiene and to reduce congestion in traditional 
markets. 
 
While modern supermarkets, convenience stores, and hypermarkets were nearly non-existent 
in the early 1990s, they have now captured an estimated 30 percent of the urban food market 
and are growing at rates of 30 to 40 percent annually (Hu et al., 2004). Supermarkets first 
developed in the south and east coast of China, and then in major northern cities like Beijing, 
Tianjin and Dalian. Recently, supermarkets are penetrating to western inland China. 
Consumers targeted by supermarkets were first rich and middle income group in big cities, 
then expanded to lower income group and smaller cities.  
 
Supermarkets at its early stage in China were small-scale shops that focused on food, 
especially processed food. With the entering of foreign companies, such as Tesco and 
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Carrefour, fresh produce became an important category for supermarkets. This foreign direct 
investment pushed the development of domestic supermarket chains, and the dominating 
types of stores in the supermarket sector are now big scale hypermarkets. Moreover, former 
state owned food stores went privatized, bankrupted or were taken over by modern chain 
stores. Domestic supermarket chains advanced aggressively to inland and secondary cities, 
aiming at taking over the market before foreign companies enter the region. It is estimated 
that in big cities about 30% of all fresh produce is retailed through supermarkets. 
 
The growth of supermarkets in China can be related to increased demand for the specific 
services they can provide, resulting from rapid urbanization, per capita income growth, 
increasing employment of women, “westernization” of life styles, particularly among younger 
people, reduction of effective food prices for consumers because of supermarkets’ greater 
ability to control costs through economies of scale, improved logistics, and growing access to 
refrigerators, allowing larger quantities of food to be stored, and to cars, allowing shopping to 
be done away from the immediate vicinity of the home. 
 
The rise of supermarkets in retailing (fresh) agricultural products has major implications for 
the supply chain. Supermarkets in general favor centralized procurement system, specialized 
and dedicated wholesalers, preferred supplier systems, and private standards for fresh produce 
(Shepherd, 2005). The purchasing practices of supermarket chains, with their demand for 
standardization and high quality products, large volume purchases, and their practice of 
delayed payments, mitigate in favor of large-scale production by well-resourced suppliers. 
Small producers find themselves barred from access to the high-value market and trapped 
behind an insurmountable wall separating them from consumers.  
 
These developments in the agricultural markets and food retail are making it harder for small 
farmers to get market access and to compete. It is exactly for this reason that producer 
organizations are so important, as they can be (part of) the solution. By establishing POs, 




4.  New Producer Organizations in China 
 
Voluntary POs are not a completely new phenomenon in China. In the first half of the 20th 
century, before the founding of the communist state, some parts of China experienced the 
working of voluntary producer-led cooperatives (Du, 2002; mentioned in Hu et al., 2007). 
However, from the 1950s onwards, cooperatives were used by the government to centrally 
control and manage agricultural production, trade and consumption. Under the system of 
collective farming, the supply of inputs, the agricultural production itself, and the distribution 
of the products were all directed by the central plan. All collection and distribution of farm 
products was managed by state agencies under the “Unified Procurement and Sales System 
(UPSS)”. In the case of vegetables and pork, so-called category II products, supply and sales 
cooperatives procured the farm products, while state-owned trading companies retailed them 
to urban consumers. This situation continued until the market liberalizations of the mid 1980s.  
 
In the 1980s, collective farming was gradually transformed into family-based farming, while 
the unified collection and distribution system was substituted by a more market-oriented 
system. Since the abolishment of the UPSS in 1985, markets were fully liberalized for fruits 
and vegetables, pork, sea-food, eggs, and other agricultural products (with the exclusion of 
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cotton and grains). Different marketing channels developed for these products, with farmers 
themselves, government agencies, traditional cooperatives, state farms, and private traders all 
become marketing enterprises. Wet markets, which were under restriction during the planned 
economy, came back to life soon after the reform. In addition, wholesale markets and 
professional traders rapidly expanded their business, as interregional trade was fully 
liberalized. Within these liberalized domestic markets, POs can play an important role in 
linking producers with customers.  
 
Producer Organizations are known under different names in China: farmer associations, 
farmer professional associations, farmer professional cooperatives, farmers’ cooperative 
associations, farmer cooperative economic organization, etc. One distinction often made is 
between associations and cooperatives. Although the term association (xie hui) is not very 
precise, it is used in World Bank publications on POs in China as well as by Sonntag et al. 
(2005) in their extensive review of China’s agricultural and rural developments. This term 
started to appear in the 1980s, mostly referring to farmer organizations established to provide 
members with technical support and information. Associations can be informal as well as 
formal. While association more or less cover every farmer organization, the term cooperative 
(hezuo she) is more restricted, but equally ambiguous. For farmers it generally has negative 
connotations as the rural areas of China only started to prosper with the dismantling of the 
communes and introduction of the family responsibility system and with the end of the 
monopoly position of government owned commercial organizations which operated under the 
name of cooperatives. Nevertheless, the term ‘cooperative’ is beginning to dominate parts of 
the discussion on farmer associations that carry out economic functions. The term is used in 
the 2005 Zhejiang Province law on farmer professional cooperative (nongmin zhuanye 
hezuoshe) as well as in the new national law on farmer professional cooperatives. Finally, 
translation of the Chinese terms into English adds to the confusion. For instance, the term 
zhuanye can be interpreted either as ‘professional’ or as ‘specialized’. While in World Bank 
publications the term professional is used (as in farmer professional association), Hu et al. 
(2007) use the term specialized (as in farmer specialized association and farmer specialized 
cooperative).2 
 
According to Hu et al. (2007) associations and cooperatives differ in the ownership of fixed 
assets, as well is in their main function. The farmer professional cooperatives are similar to 
the cooperatives in Western Europe and North America: they are engaged in the marketing 
and processing of agricultural products, and they own fixed assets. Farmer professional 
associations (FPAs) are mostly set up to provide technical assistance and to share information 
among the members. They do no charge a membership fee and do generally not own fixed 
assets. The term FPA is rather broad, and includes both organizations with thousands of 
members and community organizations with only a dozen farmers. The professional 
cooperatives can be found mostly in the Eastern (and more developed) parts of China, while 
the FPA dominates in Western and Central China (Hu et al., 2007). 
 
Detailed figures on the number of POs in China are hard to come by. On the basis of a 
nationwide survey in 2003, Shen et al. (2005) conclude that about 7 percent of all villages in 
China had functioning FPAs and about 2 percent of farm households in China were members 
of such FPAs. Hu et al. (2007: 442) report data from the Rural Development Institute of the 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, stating that in 2004 China had more than 150,000 POs, 
of which 65% were FPAs and 35% were farmer professional cooperatives. Data on the 
                                                 
2
 In this paper we follow the World Bank custom of translating zhuanye into professional. 
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number of POs in China must be interpreted with care, due to the above mentioned difficulties 
of names as well as because many POs are not formally registered (while a part of the 
formally registered POs are not functioning). 
 
 
5.  Case studies 
 
We now would like to present three brief case studies of POs in three different Chinese 
provinces. All three cases provide information on the challenges that newly established POs 
are facing, in their internal organization, in their relationship with state agencies, and in their 
quest for capital. The case about cooperatives in Zhejiang Province, on the east coast just 
south of Shanghai, is particularly interesting because Zhejiang has a provincial law on 
cooperatives since 2005. One of the challenges for POs in Zhejiang province is how to 
balance member interests with shareholder interests. Another case is about POs in Yunnan, a 
province in the south of China, bordering Birma and Laos. This mountainous province is one 
of the poorest regions in China. The challenge presented in this case is how to combine the 
interests of government agencies supporting (the establishment of) POs and of the members to 
maintain full control over the PO. The third case is about POs in Hunan Province, in the 
central/south part of the country. Hunan is major fruit producing region, with good climate 
conditions for many fresh produce crops. However, it is not close to major urban areas, so 
supply chain management is of crucial importance for farmers in this region. Federated 
cooperative structures can perform these joint supply chain functions. One of the main 
challenges for POs in Hunan is to find a balance between the marketing activities at the local 
and regional level. 
 
5.1 Zhejiang Province3 
 
Zhejiang Province is located on the east coast of China, south of Shanghai. The province has 
about 46 million inhabitants. For the development of POs in China, Zhejiang Province is of 
great interest, as it was chosen by the national Ministry of Agriculture as a pilot for promoting 
the establishment of farmer professional cooperatives. In 2004, Zhejiang Province had 1789 
farmer professional cooperatives and 1019 farmer professional associations. In 2005, the 
provincial government passed a provincial law on farmer professional cooperatives. 
 
The main reasons for farmers in Zhejiang Province to become member of a cooperative are to 
get access to markets and to obtain technological support to improve on-farm productivity and 
quality. This demand of farmers on their cooperative also influences their selection of board 
members. They are more likely to select as members of the board of directors those farmers 
that have large farms themselves, as these have proven to be successful in market access. 
 
One of the interesting characteristics of farmer professional cooperatives is the relationship 
between shareholders and members. In Zhejiang Province cooperatives not all members are 
necessarily also shareholders. This means that the equity capital of the cooperative is provided 
by a subset of the membership. In addition, not all shareholders are members. This means that 
the cooperative may obtain equity capital from persons, firms or other organizations that do 
not patronize the cooperative. In Zhejiang Province, one can find cooperatives where all 
members are also shareholders as well as cooperatives where only 1 percent of the members 
are shareholders. On the basis of shareholder/member ratio, the cooperatives in Zhejiang 
                                                 
3
 This description of the development of cooperatives in Zhejiang Province is based on an empirical study 
carried out by Hu et al. (2007). 
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Province can be divided into two groups. In one group only a minority of members is 
shareholder. The membership of the cooperatives in this group consists of a small number of 
core members (being large shareholders) and a large number of common members (being just 
users). In the other group of cooperatives a majority of the members is also shareholder. But 
even in this group, shareholding is quite concentrated, and the big shareholders play a 
dominant role in providing equity capital. 
 
In general, large farmers play a major role in Chinese cooperatives, as shareholders, as 
members of the board of directors, as large users of the cooperative. With the success of their 
individual farm, their relationships, their knowledge of markets, and their access to 
technology, these farmers/directors are considered the right persons to lead the cooperative. In 
addition, the relationships that core members have with common members, for instance 
through kinship, signals the commitment of the core member to the cooperative. The 
director’s ability to access both technology and downstream markets is a reason for common 
members to grant substantial decision rights to the director(s). Hu et al. (2007) emphasize that 
farmer cooperatives in China are rooted in the Chinese traditional culture of personal 
relations. Thus, efficient and effective governance is not only obtained by formal structures, 
but also by social mechanisms such as social control, commitment and trust.4 
 
5.2 Yunnan Province5 
 
In Yunnan Province, especially in the hilly border regions, farmers are resource poor, having 
access to on average not more than half a hectare of land. Infrastructure is, however, 
improving rapidly enabling access to markets and opening up new economic possibilities. In 
order to capitalize on new these opportunities collective actions in organizing supply and 
marketing is crucial. Associations and cooperatives are formed around major commercial 
commodities such as dairy, fruits, vegetables, and coffee or new promising cash crops such as 
macadamia nuts, peppers, and oranges. A typical PO has 100 to 200 members. Establishment 
of POs is often initiated by local governments within broader support programs promoting 
production and marketing of selected crops. Next to regional economic targets (such as 
reaching quantitative production levels) such programs have pro-poor objectives such as 
supporting farmer income.  
 
Let us look at the example of a PO from Yinjiang County in DeHong Prefecture. The county 
administration is actively promoting the establishment of farmers associations. One the first 
associations that has been established in the country, in 2002, is a potato association. Potato is 
a new crop to the region. Production and marketing potentials of potato are promising. So far, 
the association has been very successful in marketing. Customers such as traders and 
processors are responding positively to the possibility to contract large volumes at once and 
not having to deal with a large number of individual farmers.  
 
The potato association was established in the village by the administrative authorities. From 
the very start, the potato association received major support from the local government, such 
as a founding grant, office building and technical support. In 2006, the association had has 
244 members and 13 person personnel. The personnel is remunerated by the local government 
but the objective is that the association will be able to pay for own personnel in the near 
                                                 
4
  Personal relationships can support the efficiency and effectiveness of the cooperative, as Hu et al. (2007) 
argue, but may also lead to oligarchy and nepotism.  
5
 The information on POs in Yunnan Province has been collected, mainly through interviews with PO leaders 
and government officials, by Rik Delnoye, in 2006. 
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future. In 2005 the association signed a contract for delivering 4800 tons to a processing 
company. In 2006, contracts for delivering 15,000 tons were signed, for which 3200 
households were contracted, totaling an area of 13,000 mu (= 870 hectares).  
 
The potato association applies a cooperative model with members and (separate) shareholders 
(similar to cooperatives in Zhejiang Province). For the members the cooperative functions as 
a service provider while for the shareholders receiving part of the profit of the cooperative is 
the main benefit. Shareholders do not hold voting rights. Out of the profits, 30% is paid out to 
the shareholders. 
 
Farmers and their newly established PO find themselves in an ambiguous situation. They still 
lack the capacities to manage the organization themselves and lack the financial means to 
recruit professional assistance, while local government is eager to provide support. But 
instead of strengthening the human capacity among the members of the cooperative, in order 
to create a pool of potential leaders, government agencies often place own staff at key 
functions (such as general of financial manager) and thereby undermine the independence of 
the PO. This threatens to reduce the commitment of the members to actively participate, to 
comply with cooperative regulations, and to provide equity capital. It may even reduce the 
willingness of farmers to join the cooperative (depending on the alternatives available). 
 
At present the leaders of the association face several challenges, both on operational and 
organizational issues. As hundreds of farmers have indicated that they are interested in 
becoming member, the cooperative has to scale up its operations and thus needs investment 
capital. In addition, the leadership is looking for equitable ways to remunerate the efforts of 
the members of the first hours of the cooperative. How to keep shareholders satisfied (and 
even getting new shareholders) without making profit growth into the main objective of the 
cooperative? In addition, leaders are looking for the optimal decision-making structure. Most 
of the current members are living in the village were the association was established but the 
organization plans to expand to neighboring townships. Presently the board of the association 
exists of elected leaders (mainly the initiators of the association). The future governance 
structure, particularly the representation of the new townships, is still under discussion. The 
present leadership fears an increase in heterogeneity of the membership but sees good 
potential for the production capacity new members would bring in. 
 
From this brief description of new POs in Yunnan Province we can draw the following 
conclusions. Market developments are fostering the establishment of POs. By joining 
resources, farmers can strengthen their bargaining position, can develop supply chain 
linkages, and can obtain access to technical and marketing expertise. However, the major 
challenge is to set up and maintain an independent farmer-led organization, while obtaining 
some support from governmental agencies, but not let the government have control over the 
PO. Farmers and farmer representatives are well aware of this challenge, and time and again 
emphasize the need for establishing truly self-help, farmer-led organizations and not 
organizations that are development tools in the hands of government. 
  
5.3 Hunan Province6 
 
The provincial Agricultural Bureau (= Ministry of Agriculture) estimated the number of 
farmer professional cooperatives in Hunan Province at nearly 13,000. Hunan is a major fruit 
                                                 
6
 The information on POs in Hunan Province has been collected, mainly through field interviews with PO 
leaders and government officials, by Giel Ton, in 2005. 
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producing province. For this case we visited several cooperatives of orange producers in the 
Fenghuang County and in the city of Zhangjiajie, the main city in the County. These 
cooperatives had been formed recently and were in the process of establishing a federative 
structure to carry out joint marketing activities. 
 
The South Great Wall Green Fruit Industry Association groups the associations of several 
villages around the town of Liaojiaqiao. It is a cooperative consisting of 500 members coming 
from 20 villages. The membership is rather heterogeneous, with fruit growing families, fruit 
processing families and fruit selling families. Current activities are concentrated on quality 
improvement and brand name development assisted by the local office of the Agricultural 
Bureau. The cooperative has entered into several interesting contracts with middlemen, 
however is not able to sell all the products of its members. The marketing activities of the 
town cooperative are additional to those of the village cooperatives and of the members 
individually. The town cooperative is commissioned to market the products of the village 
local cooperatives, but sometimes find it difficult to deliver the right quantity and quality as 
the village cooperatives and individual members can make deals on their own at the same 
time.  
 
The financial sustainability of the association is still weak. No commission fee is charged, and 
current costs of the cooperative are assumed by the (richer) board members as being part of 
their individual marketing costs. Training and technical support is provided for free by the 
Township Government. As no significant internal income is generated and costs are assumed 
rather informally by the board members, priority in this cooperative seems to be the 
strengthening of the internal organization and the clarification of the benefit that the township 
cooperative has compared to the village cooperatives and the county cooperative. As many 
members are also involved in pig raising and horticulture, internal policy discussions take 
place about maintaining the focus on fruits or diversifying into other members’ products. 
 
Fruit cooperatives from different towns and villages have formed a regional cooperative on 
the county level. The membership of the regional cooperatives consists of three township 
level cooperatives and thirteen village level cooperatives. The regional cooperative started 
operations in September 2004. Membership fee varies by size of the member: 50 yuan for big 
cooperatives and 30 yuan for small cooperatives. The regional cooperative represents 5000 
fruit growers. The main activity is sorting and marketing of oranges. In 2004 the cooperative 
has been exporting to Canada, has organized a wholesale market, and has participated in 
business fairs. The county cooperative manages to sell approximately 30 percent of the total 
member produce. Additional services to its members include providing market information 
and indicating quality requirement of potential buyers. One of the challenges for the regional 
cooperative is to maintain trust of its members, particularly on the issue of price 
determination. Board members receive training in marketing, but pure commercial activities 
are delegated to professional staff. Another challenge is to maintain a clear division of tasks 





The rural economy in China is experiencing major transformations. While most farmers are 
still small scale producers, they are pressed to adjust to rapidly changing agricultural markets. 
Producer organizations are a major tool in the hands of farmers to improve their access to and 
position in markets and thereby raise their income. In setting up and running associations and 
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cooperatives, farmers are faced with a number of organizational and operational challenges. 
Governments are both part of the solution and the cause of these problems. In this concluding 
section we will summarized the major challenges for Chinese POs as they have appeared in 
the general and case descriptions above. 
 
First, economic and political reforms provide many opportunities for farmers and thereby for 
new POs to be established. However, the new national law on cooperatives is sending 
ambivalent signals to farmers and local government officials. On the one hand it emphasizes 
that POs are self-help organizations of farmers who associate voluntarily and maintain control 
over their organization. On the other hand it considers POs as organizations that can be 
entrusted with the task of implementing rural and agricultural development projects, which 
may turn the cooperatives into agents for the implementation of government policy. Farmers 
planning to set up a PO, or those in the boards of existing POs, may find it hard to keep 
sufficient distance from state authorities, as they need financial and other support to get the 
PO really working. Here, third party support from inside or outside of China may be helpful 
in training both farmers and government officials about the need to keep a clear separation 
between private and public roles. 
 
Second, POs in China seem to be very heterogeneous in their membership. It is not 
uncommon for the membership to include individual farmers, representatives from processing 
and trading enterprises, government agencies, and people from research institutes. Non-
farmers often take the lead in managing the PO. While this may be rational from the 
perspective of getting different stakeholders to support the establishment of new POs, it 
usually leads to difficult decision-making processes. In addition, other interests than farmer 
interests may become dominant, which may affect member commitment and thereby 
organizational efficiency. Related to the issue over heterogeneous membership is the 
distribution of income rights and decision rights. Having non-members as providers of equity 
capital may lead to conflicting interests between members and investors. Members want 
favorable patronage conditions, investors want a high return-on-investment. Even when 
investors have no decision rights (no votes), the cooperative still has to take their interest into 
account otherwise they may withdraw their investments.  
 
Third, most small farmers do not have the knowledge and experience to actively participate in 
the PO decision making, even though this is one of the basic conditions for the good 
functioning of a farmer-controlled PO. While in most developed countries generations of 
farmers have had experience with jointly owned, democratically run POs, farmers in China 
have only recently started to learn about the advantages and disadvantages of a PO as well as 
about their rights and obligations as members. 
 
Fourth, the experience of PO in other countries has shown that, even when a favorable legal 
and regulatory framework exists, an independent catalyst if often needed to get POs started, 
and to expand and perform better. Such PO promoting agencies could preferably not be state 
agencies, as it is important that the catalysts are first and foremost responsive to the needs of 
farmers and their organizations. Such catalysts could be cooperative extension services linked 
to (agricultural) universities, or they could be special independent institutes promoting POs. 
Such institutes should preferably be set up by the POs themselves. The main role of such 
institute would be to provide training to PO leaders, to help lobby governments, and to 
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